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POLAND'S PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
 
Abstract The aim of the paper is to shortly assess changes in global value chains in Poland since mid-
90s. Transformation, accession to the European Union and foreign investment have conversed Polish 
economy and trade. In addition, globalization and revolution in the global economy not only affected 
adjustment in global value chains (GVCs) but also formed new positions of countries within them. As 
a result of marketization, Poland has become an open economy which is increasingly involved in 
world trade. To illustrate a shift in polish participation in global value chains data from the Trade in 
Value Added database (TiVA) was used. The research results show that over the past 20 years, Poland 
has been opening up to the global economy. The importance of foreign value added in exports 
increased, and the position of Poland in GVC shifted down along the production chain. 
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POLAND'S PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
 
1 Introduction 
The Polish economy has changed significantly since the early 1990s. After the Second World War, the 
eastern part of Europe was under the influence of the Soviet Union. The socialist economy was 
centrally controlled and did not respond to the needs of society. Public dissatisfaction, constant 
shortages in supply and a lack of democracy have led to changes. In 1989, the first free elections took 
place and Leszek Balcerowicz's economic reform was initiated. Transformation of the socio-economic 
system was based on marketization and reprivatization. The introduction of the capitalist system was 
accompanied by capital and currency reform, liberalization of economic activity and opening the 
system for market-based allocation of resources. At the same time, the change in foreign policy, 
previously oriented to the east, into the pro-western one has conversed the directions of trade; 
Germany and other countries in western Europe became the new largest trading partner for Poland. 
One of the basic tasks of the Polish government was to introduce solutions liberalizing international 
trade. Polish trade policy needed new solutions and one of them was adopting customs law in 1989, 
which enabled Poland to participate fully in the GATT agreement. The second important action was 
the liberalization of capital flows. It has started direct foreign investments in Poland. The inflow of 
capital from abroad gave the chance to transform Poland's economy. Reprivatisation processes have 
enabled foreign companies to enter Poland while modernizing the economy. These actions helped to 
recover from the recession and to reduce the inflation. The following years were characterized by the 
adjustment of the economy and law to join the European Union. 
 
At the same time, in the last three decades, word trade has changed due to shifting in liberalization, 
technological development and transport possibilities. The set of processes known as globalization 
have transformed the global economy. The liberalization of trade connected with the Uruguay Round 
and the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) impacted on the rapid development of 
trade links. Enterprises benefited from trade facilitation, lower costs of foreign production or 
investment incentives and consequently reconstructed production process. Interconnections in 
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international trade, where each country specialized in one stage of production, has grown. In literature, 
this process is referred to “production fragmentation”, “vertical specialization”, “offshore 
outsourcing”, “international production networks” or “global supply chains”. The latter refers directly 
to the term “global value chains” (GVCs) in the context of the production and export of national added 
value.  
 
The first theoretical premises of the changes in a system of multinational relations where described by 
Leontief in the early 60's (Leontief & Strout 1963). Then, with the emergence of New Trade Economy 
(Helpman & Krugman, 1985; Krugman, 1979, 1980), the technology production line was combined 
with increasing returns of scales. This provided the foundation for analytical frameworks of 
international trade under imperfect competition (Inomata, 2017). The development of technology and 
communication made possible to use the advantages associated with the fragmentation of production 
for profit maximization. For many companies, vertical specialization is no longer an obstacle and use 
of import to produce export has grown (Johnson, 2014). Theoretical issues related to the large-scale 
use of production fragmentation began to appear at the beginning of the 21st century. Baldwin (2006) 
associated this with the concept of the second unbundling, which allowed the separation of most 
manufacturing stages. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) called it “trade in tasks”; different 
countries by adding value to global supply chains reduce costs of the global production process. The 
key difference between this approach and the traditional trade literature is that the technology of 
production is firm-specific, not country-specific (WTO, 2013).  
 
The problem has started to increase the proper measurement of trade flows. First attempts to describe 
the production process of the products became more intense in the 90s when Tempset (1996) 
described the production of the Barbie doll. Other case studies were prepared for iPod (Linden, 
Kraemer & Dedrick, 2009), iPhone (Xing & Detert, 2010) or notebook PCs (Dedrick, Kraemer & 
Linden, 2010). They showed that although these products are made in China domestic value added 
share of China in gross value is small reaching, about 4%. Traditional international trade statistics 
register gross value of goods and services as crossing borders and in effect part of the export is 
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counted twice or more. That means that gross exports consist less and less of national value added. 
Additionally calculated trade disturbs economic analysis and makes it difficult to assess the adequate 
participation of individual countries in the global economy. As a result, only the analysis of 
international trade with value added allows estimating changes in the position in the GVC of a 
particular country. 
 
Due to the revolution taking place in word economy, Poland must change two times more to catch up 
with developed economies. It is important to take a good place in the international production chain 
and, as a result, benefit from exporting the added value. So, how has the Polish position in GVC 
changed since the 90s? Has accession to the European Union influenced and accelerated changes in 
Poland's share in global value chains? The rest of the article is organized in the following way. Section 
2 describes research method and sources of statistical data. Section 3 present results of the calculation 
and finally, section 4 presents some conclusions. 
 
2 Research method and sources of statistical data 
 
Changes in the world economy combined with the fragmentation and emergence of GVC have caused 
the inadequacy of the statistics traditionally used. As noted by the OECD and WTO under long and 
divided production chains circular trade takes place (2012). An example can be repeated trade in 
goods between the USA and Mexico or trade in the European Union. To measure hidden trade in value 
added underlying gross trade, we need to go along through the global supply chains (Johnson 2014). 
This approach is feasible on a small scale when we consider individual products. When the added 
value in GVC is analyzed in the context of countries or sectors it is much more difficult to indicate 
where the next layers of value are created. First global analyzes have become possible a few years ago 
when Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) tables were created. Those tables ensured compatible 
bilateral trade flows which allowed to compare existing production networks. However, to measure 
value-added content of trade researchers requires an international input-output table. 
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An input-output approach of trade flow in value-added terms has been described, inter alia, by 
Koopman, Powers, Wang and Wei (2010) and Stehrer, Foster and de Vries (2012). Conceptual 
framework for tracking value-added also has been described by OECD and WTO (2012). It is possible 
to decompose any particular product with value Vp into the value-added generated in country i such 
that the total value of 
       
 
 
 
 
This simple formula complicates when aggregating up for a group of products or whole economy. As 
a result, it is necessary to use data that has been aggregated to some extent. Although the use of 
international input-output table allows decomposing gross trade into value added components (Figure 
1).  
 
 
Fig. 1 Visualization of the value added components of gross exports and GVC trade flows based on 
the WTO-OECD scheme. Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Database 
 
The simplest breakdown of gross exports is foreign value added (FVA) and domestic value added 
(DVA) content of exports. The first one corresponds to the value added of inputs that were imported in 
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order to produce intermediate or final goods/services to be exported. The second, domestic value 
added content of export, is decomposed of three elements (OECD & WTO, 2012): 
1. Domestic value added sent to consumer economy (DDVA – direct domestic value added) 
corresponds to the domestic value added embodied either in final or intermediate goods or services 
that are directly consumed by the importing economy. 
2. Domestic value added sent to third economies (IDVA – indirect domestic value added) represents 
the domestic value added contained in intermediates (goods or services) exported to a first economy 
that re-exports them to a third economy as embodied in other goods or services.  
3. Domestic value added re-imported in the economy outlines the domestic value added of exported 
intermediates, or inputs, that is sent back to the economy of origin as embodied in other intermediates 
and used to produce exports. Such value added round-trip between two (or more) economies 
highlights the domestic value added content present in an economy's imports. 
Decomposition methods are also described by Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2012,2014). 
 
Figure 1 also presents the exchange of value added among global value chains. On the one hand, 
domestic value added sent to third economies corresponds to forward GVC participation. It catches 
DVA contribution (from country A) sent to partner economy (country B) for further processing and 
then export through the value chain to third economies (country C). It reflects downstream links in the 
global value chain. On the other hand, foreign value added content of exports corresponds to backward 
GVC participation (upstream links in the chain). It represents FVA contribution imported to country A 
to produce intermediate or final goods/services and afterward exported to partner economy (country 
B). Both indicators make possible to present the actual contribution of individual economies to the 
global economy and at the same time allow indicating 'where in the global supply chain is a given 
country'? Together, forward and backward indicators, enable construction GVC participation and 
position index.
1
 
 
                                                             
1
 Both indexes can be calculated for a country or a single sector. 
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According to UNCTAD (2013) and Koopman et al. (2010) GVC participation index specifies the 
share of a country’s exports that is part of a multi-stage trade process. It means it is the foreign value 
added (FVA) used in a country’s exports (backward participation/upstream perspective) plus the 
indirect domestic value added (IDVA) in export (forward participation/downstream perspective), 
divided by total exports. 
                  
        
           
  
This measure should be used together with the GVC position index which allows indicating location 
of the country in the production chain. This can be done by comparison country’s exports of 
intermediates that are used by other countries (the indirect domestic value added - IDVA) witch that 
country’s use of imported intermediates (the foreign value added - FVA) otherwise log ratio of a 
country-sectors supply of intermediates used in other countries’ exports to the use of imported 
intermediates in its own production. 
                  
    
           
        
   
           
  
If the index has a positive value, i.e. IDVA is higher than FVA, then the country lies upstream in the 
global value-chain. In the opposite situation, i.e. when FVA is higher than IDVA, the index has a 
negative value and it means the country lies downstream in the GVC. In other words, if the country 
exports raw materials or intermediaries it lies upstream in the GVC however, if the country uses a 
large portion of import intermediates to produce final goods for exports, it lies downstream in the 
GVC.  
 
The previously mentioned trade in tasks combines with a different added value at various production 
levels. In 90s Stan Shih, Acer CEO, noted that manufacturing means making money from manual 
labor which adds little value, in contrast to tasks connected with R&D, marketing, etc. which add 
much value as connected with ‘brains’ (Kase, Slocum & Zhang, 2011; UNCTAD, 2015). He plotted 
his observations on graph presenting the relationship between value added and production value chain. 
Figure 2 presents Stan Shih Smiling Curve. Therefore, in the context of the added value, the position 
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in the GVC is very important. Both high and low levels of GVC position index combine with high 
added value (Baldwin, Forslid & Ito, 2016; Ye, Meng & Wei, 2015)  
 
Fig. 2 The smiling curve of Stan Shih 
 
One of the largest databases that contain information about value-added trading is Trade in Value 
Added database (TiVA). This database was created as a result of joint OECD – WTO initiative. TiVA 
provides indicators from more than 60 economies (OECD, EU28, G20, East and South-east Asian 
economies) and 34 industrial sectors. It contains (2016 version) information from 1995 to 2011 and, in 
some cases, to 2014. In the next section, data from the TiVA database was used to describe changes in 
global value chains in Poland in years 1995 to 2014. 
 
 
3 Results of the calculation 
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content of export. Figure 3 shows polish foreign value added content of gross exports since the mid-
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recorded an increase in the share of foreign value added in gross exports (Figure 3b). However, the 
dynamic growth of FDA in Poland has managed to reach the average EU level. 
 
Fig. 3a Foreign value added content of gross exports in Poland from 1995 to 2014 
 
 
Fig. 3b Foreign value added content of gross exports by European countries in 1995 and 2014 
 
Due to the increase in the share of FVA in gross exports, the share of DVA decreases both in relation 
to intermediate and final products (Figure 4). Adjustments in Poland’s share of DVA are very similar 
to changes taking place in other countries of the European Union. Although the diminishing share of 
domestic value added in the export of final products may be disturbing; it may mean an unfavorable 
change in polish position in GVC. 
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Fig. 4 Domestic value added content of gross export by end-use category in Poland and EU25* since 
1995 to 2011. 
* Here and below abbreviation ‘EU25’ used with reference to the statistics means countries of the 
European Union without Cyprus, Latvia and Malta. 
 
Poland industry's participation in domestic and foreign value content of gross export indicates 
considerable variations. Domestic value added contribution to gross export achieves the highest shares 
for Transport and storage, Motor vehicles and Food products respectively. However, it should be 
noted that in the case of Motor vehicles industry, it is also characterized by highest share of foreign 
value input to gross export. 
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Fig 5 Poland's industries share of domestic and foreign value content of gross exports in 2014 
 
 
Fig 6a Poland and EU25 participation index since 1995 to 2014 
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Fig 6b Poland and EU25 position index since 1995 to 2014 
The index of Poland's participation in global value chains (Figure 6a) increased from the mid-1990s to 
the start of the crisis in 2009 by around 10 percentage points. In subsequent years, after a decline in 
2009, it stabilized at around 61%. In comparison to data from European statistics, the Polish share in 
GVC is above average. This means that in the case of Poland, international production chains are 
important to the development of the economy. Along with the increase in the participation in GVC, the 
position of Poland and the EU25 in GVC also changed (Figure 6b). The general trend indicates the 
move of European economies with along global production chains from upstream to downstream. 
Polish shift had a greater amplitude than EU25; since 1995 to 2014 in case of Poland it was 0,09 and 
in the EU25 about half less (0,05).  
 
Fig 7a Poland’s position and participation index since 1995 to 2014 
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Fig 7b Poland’s position and participation index by industry in 2014 
 
The total changes in the Polish GVC position and participation index are presented in Figure 6c and 
they are broken down by industry in Figure 6d. The differences between industries are very large and 
each case should be analyzed separately. Below I will present only two selected examples. Detailed 
information about changes in position and participation in GVC by industries can also be found in the 
Annex – Figures 10a to 10d. 
 
Fig 8 Poland’s position and participation index in agriculture in 2014 
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In 2014 Food products hold the highest position in global value chains and their share in GVC 
participation index is over 70%; it is at the most upstream end of the value chain. However, it should 
be noted that although this last mentioned index has not changed significantly over the last 20 years, 
the first one has fallen by 60%. What is important, this fall is not caused by the increasing share of 
FVA in exports, but it is rather a change in the proportion of indirect and direct value added exported. 
Poland is increasingly exporting Food products directly to its trading partners (IDVA fall); this is 
supported by joining the EU in 2004 and opening up to international trade.  
 
Fig 9 Poland’s position and participation index in ICT & electronicsin 2014 
 
On the other end of value chain, at the most downstream side is Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) & electronics industry; this industry exports mostly use imported components for 
production. The participation index in GVC of this industry in recent years, beyond the period of the 
economic crisis, it fluctuates around 75%. 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
Transformation of the world economy and the internal adjustment of Poland have influenced the 
growth in trade openness and benefits in international production chains. Trade in tasks, adding new 
layers of value, GVC appearance, etc. revolutionize the perception of global economy. To export, we 
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must first import. By measuring trade in value added it became possible to analyze commercial 
realities in the international production chain and at the same time to describe modification in global 
value chains.  
 
The key finding from the research is that Poland has integrated significantly into global economy since 
1995. Polish accession to the EU preceded by marketization and reprivatization increased export of 
foreign value added. Simultaneously, changes in the DVA confirm the inclusion of Poland in 
international production chains. Moreover, general analysis of the Polish GVC position index indicates 
a shift from upstream to downstream position on global value chain. According to the relationship 
between the value added GVC (Figure 2), the progressive decrease of GVC position index (shifting 
towards the end of GVC resulting in negative value of the index) should cause an increase of exported 
value added.  
 
Similar adjustments take place in most EU25 countries. Changes that have taken place in Poland are 
therefore a reflection of changes taking place in the global economy. Certainly, the Polish economy is 
strongly connected with international production chains. If they change, Polish participation in global 
value chains will also change. However, the last 2-3 years covered by the analysis is the period in 
which the changes have lost their rate. That is why it will be very interesting to compare the presented 
results with data from the following years. For now, it is difficult to assess whether the slowdown of 
changes is the result of the economic crisis or a constant trend change in global economy. 
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Annex 
  
  
  
Fig 10a Poland’s position and participation index since 1995 to 2014 by industries 
 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
0,00 
0,01 
0,02 
0,03 
0,04 
0,05 
0,06 
0,07 
0,08 
19
95
 
19
97
 
19
99
 
20
01
 
20
03
 
20
05
 
20
07
 
20
09
 
20
11
 
20
13
 
G
V
C
 p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 in
d
ex
 
G
V
C
 p
o
zi
ti
o
n
 in
d
ex
 
Agriculture 
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
35% 
40% 
45% 
50% 
0,00 
0,01 
0,01 
0,02 
0,02 
0,03 
0,03 
0,04 
0,04 
0,05 
0,05 
19
95
 
19
97
 
19
99
 
20
01
 
20
03
 
20
05
 
20
07
 
20
09
 
20
11
 
20
13
 
G
V
C
 p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 in
d
ex
 
G
V
C
 p
o
zi
ti
o
n
 in
d
ex
 
Mining 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
0,00 
0,02 
0,04 
0,06 
0,08 
0,10 
0,12 
0,14 
0,16 
19
95
 
19
97
 
19
99
 
20
01
 
20
03
 
20
05
 
20
07
 
20
09
 
20
11
 
20
13
 
G
V
C
 p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 in
d
ex
 
G
V
C
 p
o
zi
ti
o
n
 in
d
ex
 
Food products 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
-0,04 
-0,02 
0,00 
0,02 
0,04 
0,06 
0,08 
19
95
 
19
97
 
19
99
 
20
01
 
20
03
 
20
05
 
20
07
 
20
09
 
20
11
 
20
13
 
G
V
C
 p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 in
d
ex
 
G
V
C
 p
o
zi
ti
o
n
 in
d
ex
 
Textiles & apparel 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
0,00 
0,02 
0,04 
0,06 
0,08 
0,10 
0,12 
19
95
 
19
97
 
19
99
 
20
01
 
20
03
 
20
05
 
20
07
 
20
09
 
20
11
 
20
13
 
G
V
C
 p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 in
d
ex
 
G
V
C
 p
o
zi
ti
o
n
 in
d
ex
 
Wood & paper 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
-0,08 
-0,06 
-0,04 
-0,02 
0,00 
0,02 
0,04 
0,06 
0,08 
0,10 
0,12 
19
95
 
19
97
 
19
99
 
20
01
 
20
03
 
20
05
 
20
07
 
20
09
 
20
11
 
20
13
 
G
V
C
 p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 in
d
ex
 
G
V
C
 p
o
zi
ti
o
n
 in
d
ex
 
Coke & petroleum 
19 
 
  
  
  
Fig 10b Poland’s position and participation index since 1995 to 2014 by industries 
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Fig 10c Poland’s position and participation index since 1995 to 2014 by industries 
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Fig 10d Poland’s position and participation index since 1995 to 2014 by industries 
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